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I. Introduction 
The so called advance fee fraud, or 419 scam, is an international 
criminal phenomenon that has dramatically evolved over the past 
years with the development of the Internet. The gist of the fraud 
resides in persuading prospective victims to pay a modest amount 
of money, through the false promise of receiving substantial 
benefits in return. Massive sending of emails is generally the 
technique used to sound the internet for finding promising 
gullible candidates who are tempted by quick and easy gain. Once 
the contact has been initiated, the particularly credible scammer 
will argue the potential victim into feeding an account with 
advance fee. There are a broad variety of scenarios, but most 
typically, the emails describe the need, under different pretexts, 
to move funds from West Africa. The person who will provide 
assistance by making his own account available for this 
transaction will be offered a generous commission. Scenarios 
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evolve with actual international events that are good pretexts for 
asking for help or suggesting a potential substantial gain. 
These messages reach a large quantity of potential victims in any 
country. It has been demonstrated that the emails provenance is 
mostly West Africa and particularly Nigeria. However, scammers 
tend to install an activity also in the other continents. For 
instance, it has been detected that, in Europe, a substantial 
quantity of spam originate from the Netherlands (Edelson, 2003) 
(Schiffer, Birrer, Cartier, Capt & Ribaux, 2004). Emails sent from 
one country often propose contacts (phone number, fax, etc) in 
another country. This presumes some degree of organization: tasks 
are distributed over different people who have different roles and 
who are spread over a broad geographical area. More generally, the 
roots of the phenomenon are certainly to be found in the worrying 
worldwide development of organized crime coming from West Africa 
(ONU, 2005) which is also a destabilizing factor for this region 
(Viosca, Bergiel & Balsmeier, 2004). The amounts stolen are 
difficult to estimate but seem to be very significant by only 
considering specific cases reported which are only a small part of 
the reality (Edelson, 2003) (Smith, Holmes & Kaufmann, 1999) 
(National White Collar Crime Center and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2002). The impact of this pervasive phenomenon that 
monopolizes internet resources, in particular the nuisances caused 
to the web users is also not to be neglected. However, even if 
punctual strategic analysis provides indication about the extent 
and the development of this criminality, there are difficulties to 
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deeply understand its underlying mechanisms (Office Fédéral de la 
police, 2003). 
Preventative approaches reside in the dissemination through 
different media of warning messages to the community. A successful 
situational method consists in spam filtering that avoid mailboxes 
invasion (Edelson, 2003). Repressive style of policing provides 
limited results. The efforts deployed by the criminal justice 
system lead only occasionally to condemnations of suspects. The 
international nature of the phenomenon and inadequate legal 
frameworks are mentioned as probable causes of this weakness 
(Edelson, 2003) (Oriola, 2005), but when a case is investigated in 
depth, the importance of the amount stolen and the money 
laundering mechanism appear clearly (Bécherraz, 2004a) (Bécherraz, 
2004b). Despite those edifying examples, perpetrators are still 
very rarely prosecuted and when the case crosses jurisdictional 
boundaries, the chance to succeed dramatically decreases. 
There is no global strategy for fighting against this phenomenon 
that rapidly evolves and extends to other types of frauds that use 
the spam technique. In particular, another form is illustrated by 
the “phishing” method that consists of inciting connections on 
websites that imitate an existing e-banking service with the 
intention to capture passwords and access codes.  
The objective of the project is to promote an intelligence-led 
approach by systematically collecting, collating and analyzing the 
form, the content and the provenance of spam in an operational and 
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strategic perspective. The utility and feasibility of this 
approach has been tested through this preliminary study. 
II. The project 
Individual who feel that a fraudulent mechanism is behind a 
typical advance fee fraud message frequently forward the received 
email to the police. It is assumed that the form and content of 
these emails have an intelligence potential that is not 
systematically used, neither at a strategic, nor at an operational 
level. Punctual studies have already demonstrated some interest in 
reasoning on this information, mostly in order to evaluate the 
provenance of the messages (Edelson, 2003) (Schiffer et al., 
2004), but there was still a need to find out original and useful 
forms of inferences that can be drawn through a deeper analysis of 
these emails. Specifically, the potential of this set of 
information for sorting out the activity of different groups of 
scammers has been tested through this study. Moreover, there was 
also an interest in detecting if an activity was physically 
installed within a country of interest (in this study: 
Switzerland). The evaluation of the obtained results has been 
considered to provide indications about the worth of undertaking 
other steps toward the design and implementation of a more 
ambitious intelligence process. 
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III. Material and method 
The sample 
A sample of 400 emails collected during two separated periods of 
three months has been manually collated in an iBase® database. 
Visualization facilities have also been implemented through the 
use of Analyst’s Notebook® (I2 group inc.) in order to explore and 
represent detected links. 
Links 
Moreover, links will be assumed through similarities detected 
between emails, such as correspondence between scenarios, 
similitude in the contact details or other clues that could 
indicate some “proximity” between the senders of the emails. At 
this stage, knowledge is insufficient for a more formal 
classification. Thus, it has been provisionally decided to 
classify those hypothetical links into three categories or levels. 
y Level 1, represented by a plain line: two emails are linked when 
there is a high degree of certainty that the same group of 
people are at the origin of the emails. It applies for instance 
when the same contact details (phone number, email address or 
fax number) appear in both texts. 
y Level 2, represented by a dotted line: the validity of link is 
subject to doubt. It is used for instance to represent 
information related to the localization of the sender (see 
below). 
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y Level 3, represented as a dashed line: is an attempt to connect 
information. It applies for instance when two emails show some 
degree of proximity through similar scenarios or names appearing 
in the text. 
Variables 
The structure of the database first designed in a previous 
preliminary study (Schiffer et al., 2004) has been simplified. It 
has been chosen to concentrate on a limited set of attributes 
(figure 1) that have been assumed to have a good potential for 
linking: 
y phone/fax numbers, address and name of people appearing in the 
scenario 
y IP (Internet Protocol) numbers 
y email addresses included in the header and the contents of the 
message 
y dates and time 
IP numbers have a technical flavor and their interpretation can 
cause some specific problems. They are to be further described. 
IP Numbers 
A unique number is attributed by Internet Service Providers (ISP) 
to each computer during each connection to the internet. This 
process assigns an identity to the machine that is technically 
used for reliably guiding transfers of information. The numbers 
distributed by each ISP themselves belong to a delineated list 
received from accredited organisms that organize the management of 
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IP numbers in the world in order to avoid collisions (different 
machines connected with the same IP number at the same time on the 
internet). These numbers are of particular interest from a 
forensic perspective, because it is theoretically possible to know 
which ISP a specific machine was connected to, from an IP number 
of interest collected at a certain time. Then, under certain 
conditions that depend on legal frameworks in the country where 
the ISP is located, the ISP can be asked by the justice to 
retrieve which computer was online during the connection of 
interest. As the IP number can appear in the header of each email, 
it is thus theoretically possible to identify the machine that 
sent the message. 
Reliability and availability of IP numbers 
Of course, this judicial procedure cannot be part of a systematic 
process as it is constrained by legal rules not directly 
applicable to the spam under examination and very complicated to 
apply when crossing jurisdictions. Thus, IP numbers as a trace 
will not deploy its full potential within the intelligence process 
under development. Only information about the ISP and its 
localization will be used to indicate the probable localization of 
the sender. But ISP can also sometimes cover wide geographical 
areas that can divert from the real localization of scammers. 
Another problem arises when considering IP numbers for linking 
emails when they are dynamically attributed by the ISP at each 
connection of a computer to the internet. In these situations, 
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more often than not, they are not the same for different 
connections for the same machine. 
The reliability of IP number can also be questioned because it is 
technically very easy to hide or spoof the IP address when sending 
emails. In these circumstances, the localization and 
identification of the machine becomes very hard, if not 
impossible. Examples have shown scammers using this technique 
extensively. 
Finally, in the process of collecting information, the headers of 
emails are frequently lost through a sequence of forwarding the 
messages. Thus IP numbers are available only in a limited set of 
situations. In this study, some IP addresses have been recovered 
through a specific process out of the scope of this paper 
(Schiffer et al., 2004). Moreover, in very specific case, 
combination of different techniques has been used to confirm the 
reliability of particular IP numbers. 
Even under those restrictions, IP numbers stay an useful 
information within our intelligence process as it will be shown. 
IV. Results 
Links based on IP numbers 
On the 400 messages, 155 have been attributed an IP number. Figure 
2 shows examples of the links that have been inferred from this 
information. 
 Exploratory study for the detection and analysis of links between prospective advance fee 
fraud emails in an intelligence perspective 
Level 1 links 
On the 400 messages, two groups of 7 emails, one group of 4 emails 
(see figure 3), six groups of 3 emails and 35 groups of 2 emails 
are found. Mostly, similarities have been also found through email 
addresses used. 
Combined links 
Links of different levels have highlighted series of connection 
between two very different types of scenarios: typical advance fee 
fraud and lottery games (figure 4). 
Activity in Switzerland 
A computer has been confirmed being used within Switzerland for 
sending emails (figure 5). This intelligence could be found with 
IP number, call number (+41 is the international calling codes for 
Switzerland) and Swiss domain names (.ch). 
V. Discussion 
The sample 
The chosen sample contains a very small proportion of emails in 
circulation and concerns only those received in a specific 
geographical area covered by one police force. It has to be 
considered that, by its temporal and geographical shape, the 
sample was likely to contain links. Thus, the potential of a 
systematic approach cannot be straightforwardly evaluated by the 
generalization of the obtained results in particular because no 
link of level 1 could be established between the two periods 
 Exploratory study for the detection and analysis of links between prospective advance fee 
fraud emails in an intelligence perspective 
separated by one year. However, strategic and operational 
potential of the method have been clearly illustrated through this 
study. 
Strategic and operational utility of detected links 
The linking process has led to the detection of a high quantity of 
links. They provide a picture of groups of particularly active 
scammers and have shown that the same groups of perpetrators can 
use very different scenarios and a certain capability of 
adaptation. Intelligence about the localization of scammers has 
also been inferred from the available information, such as 
indication about the activity of perpetrators within Switzerland.  
Exploitation of intelligence 
When an activity is detected within a country, the time delay 
available to react is usually very short for identifying and 
localizing possible suspects. For the case detected during this 
study, a preliminary investigation has been carried out by the 
police in order to verify and consolidate the information 
obtained.  However, due to the fragmentation of police forces and 
the distribution of competences in Switzerland, the case was not 
under the competency of this specific police. Moreover, there were 
hesitations about the possible qualification of the fraud 
(organized crime or not?) and thus about which structure will 
prosecute the case. Unfortunately, the time window necessary to 
launch such a judicial procedure at another level would have been 
too long to keep a chance of arresting the scammer. This example 
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emphasizes the need to carefully examine the relationship between 
the intelligence provided and possible associated measures that 
can be taken. Intelligence should be fully integrated into the 
decision process at each level. In this specific punctual example, 
the criminal justice system was not prepared to take into account 
such forms of indications. 
In a further case, another activity has been detected within the 
same region, but it has been proven that the scammer was sending 
emails through the computer network of a school, by exploiting a 
security hole. This technique was probably used to by-pass anti-
spam filters or simply to hide the real origin of the spam. At 
least, in this case, the intervention resulted rapidly in an 
update of the network security of this school.  
Level of links 
Despite the number of solid links detected, knowledge about how to 
interpret signs of proximity between emails is still lacking. 
Through the systematization of the process and experience gained 
by the analysis of specific cases, it can be assumed that the 
comprehension of links and of how to carry out an efficient 
comparison processes will iteratively improve. For instance, 
similarities have been observed between emails addresses of 
scammers that use mailboxes of very popular internet providers. 
These resemblances should be further studied in order to better 
understand some mechanisms related to the automatic generation of 
new emails accounts that are probably used for massive sending. 
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Obviously, the formalization of the comparison process will 
promote the combined use of all available variables. For instance, 
similarities in emails addresses such as “ejones” and “ericjones” 
have been confirmed through the comparison of phone numbers, 
scenarios and the proximity of the dates that indicate when the 
emails have been sent (see figure 6). Other analysts should have 
already inferred hypotheses from this information, but very few 
materials have been published on this subject. There is a need to 
stimulate exchange of knowledge about how to reason on links. The 
development of a whole intelligence process will give a chance for 
creating a community that will share and discuss these 
experiences. 
Perspectives 
Results obtained during this study with a very limited sample 
clearly plead in favor of the systematization of the process. It 
has been shown that modus operandi used by the scammers can 
rapidly evolve, but it can be assumed that the basic principle of 
massively sending unsolicited emails in order to attract people in 
a trap will stay relatively stable. Thus, the ambition of the 
project is to build an architecture that covers such situations 
and integrate for example the “phishing” method or other similar 
techniques. Within a stable framework, the architecture must be 
very flexible in order to take into account the evolution of the 
phenomenon. 
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The process will be designed around the phases of a very typical 
intelligence process: collection, collation, analysis and 
dissemination. Computerization of some part of the process is 
obviously a major objective in order to be able to treat 
substantial quantity of emails. 
In this perspective, different projects are under development:  
y the development of a computerized process that accepts, pre-
treats, and collates emails in a database 
y the organization of the collection of data with partners 
y the classification and indexation through the automatic 
recognition of scenarios and variables 
y the reproduction of similar studies with bigger samples at a 
wider geographical and temporal scale. Identification of new 
relevant variables 
y the formalization of the comparison process, a better 
conceptualization of links and the evaluation of the utility of 
the intelligence provided 
y the evaluation of text mining technologies for automatic 
analysis of the content of the emails 
y the automatic recognition of patterns 
y the development of graphical interfaces and visualization tools 
in order to favor data exploration 
However, such a process will deploy its whole efficiency only if 
it is be well integrated into the criminal justice system, in 
particular: 
y intelligence should be part of decisional processes 
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y analysis at a strategic and operational level will beneficiate 
from the use of very different types of knowledge, ranging from 
understanding about organized crime to the capacity of reasoning 
on digital traces. 
VI. Conclusion 
This exploratory study has shown the interest of systematically 
analyzing advance fee fraud's emails in an intelligence 
perspective. The analysis of a limited sample has shown great 
promises by the detection of links, the localization of scammers 
and the provision of indications about the evolution of the 
phenomenon. For such a system to be useful, it has also been 
demonstrated the necessity for a global approach that integrates 
intelligence within strategic and operative decisional process.  
There is still a lack of formalization. Links should be further 
described and understood, as well as the comparison process that 
proceeds through the combination of the use of the different 
variables. 
A flexible architecture for the whole process is under development 
through a series of preliminary projects for evaluating the degree 
of computerization that can be reasonably reached and the 
potential of new data mining techniques. 
The development of such an intelligence process could promote 
knowledge sharing and improve interpretation models in an 
iterative way.  
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Figure 1 : Architecture of database 
 
 
Figure 2 : Same IP number with several linked E-mails 
 
 
Figure 3 : Links of level 1 
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Figure 4 : Links between typical advance fee fraud and lottery 
game 
 
 
Figure 5 : E-mails linked with Switzerland 
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Figure 6 : E-mails addresses as link information 
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